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THE ATTACHMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
IsADoRE H. COHEN
INTRODUCTION

The exact scope of the problem which will be considered here is indicated in the following statement: X, a non-resident, indebted to C, is insured by a company subject to process in the creditor's jurisdiction. Under
the terms of the policy, which is payable to X's estate, X may, at his sole
whim, election, and desire, obtain the cash value of the policy. Assuming
that no exemption acts are applicable, may the cash value be attached in an
action begun by C against X before X has made any election to get the cash
value?'
Obviously the answer to the question posed2 should be found in the
statute creating the process. But the attachment acts are not unique specimens of draftsmanship: like most statutes they are written distributively.
For example, Field's provisions ran merely.to the effect that "the property
of [the] defendant" could be "attached." Thereafter the section was altered
to read that the "attachment may also be levied upon a cause of action
arising upon contract; including a bond, promissory note, or other instrument for the payment of money only, whether past due, or yet to become
due. .

. ."4

Accordingly, since the answer does not appear on the face of

the statute, it would have to be found by "construction"; and herein is
necessarily involved judicial action.
To reveal, at the outset, the answer (it is in the negative) given by the
Uf X is a resident, and judgment has been obtained against him, the cash value of
the policy may be reached in proceedings supplementary to execution. In those proceedings a frontal attack on the "personal" nature of the debtor's power to reach the
cash value is obviated by the in personam decree rendered in execution proceedings.
See Cohen, Collection of Moiey Judgments in New York: Third Party Orders (1935)
35 COL. L. REv. 1196, 1236 et seq.; also, Execution Process and Life Insurance (1939)
392 COL. L. Rxv. 139, 144, 162-163.
The "question" as thus posed obviously avoids the problem raised in most policies
where there is a designated beneficiary with power reserved to the insured-debtor to
change the beneficiary and obtain the cash value. But even if the answer to the problem
posed in this paper should have been stated in the affirmative it is difficult to believe it
could have been extended to "beneficiary" policies; such a result would mean that
"beneficiary" policies could be reached by provisional process, where the debtor is a
non-resident, and yet the same policies would be exempt from execution under the usual
insurance exemptive statute (e.g. Section 166 of the New York Insurance Law). Such a
situation is simply unbelievable. If any creditor should have the temerity to raise the
point in attachment proceedings the indicated judicial answer seems obvious. As to this,
see the discussion infra, at pp. 232, 239.
N. Y. Laws 1849, c. 438, § 227. This part of Field's Code was not favored with
any comment by the Commissioner.
4
N. Y. Civ. PrAc. AcT (Cahill, 1939) § 916. This was also the version of the N. Y.
CODE CIV. PRoc. ANN. (Bliss, 1913) § 638. It found its genesis in the Throop Revision
[N. Y. CODE CIV. PROC. (Throop, 1877) § 648].
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American courts to the problem will in no way detract from the point of
the following discussion: judicial apologetics for the given solution is professedly anchored in the statute. But the practical result is a stultification
of creditors' rights. Concededly, power was vested in the courts t6 have
reached a different result.5 And no legal justification can be found in
the debtor's relations with his insurance for the absolution judicially decreed: the debtor, in the cash value, has a fund which should be applied
to his .debt, and would have been so treated were it found in the form of
a bank account or broker's balance.6
Accordingly it is not unfair to look for the "real" reasons behind the
judicial behavior in matters outside the statute. Merely to ascribe the
result to judicial error is too glib; the position has been too long maintained
for such description to be proper. It may be due to an intentional desire
to impede the creditor's drive against his debtor's insurance. 7 Certainly,
whatever may have been the judicial motivation, the end result is not a
happy one for the creditor: since jurisdiction in personam is impossible
and jurisdiction in rem denied, there is no effective remedy.
From another angle the forces which operate on our little problem may
assume a bolder significance. The locale is American; the time, the present.
And, as everyone knows the larger forces at play on the scene exert their
various pressures on private property.8 For the creditor, and his attorney,
viewing the problem from a collection point of view, private property is
mostly fluid, i.e., "intangible." Thus the great array of ancient procedures
and devices erected to contend with physical items have lost most of their
usefulness. 9 Protection of the creditor's property-his claim against his
debtor-depends on the effecfive content given to procedural methods devised to cope with intangibles. Conversely, the absence of workable devices,
or the failure of the courts to implement procedures already existing, to
reach a debtor's intangibles represent a loss to the creditor: in his view, a
5Cf. Industrial Loan and Investment Co. v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 222 Mo.App.
1228, 3 S. W. (2d) 1046 (1928).
6
7 See authorities cited in note 1, smpra.

This conclusion does not seem inappropriate if the judicial labours are to be deemed
a measure of judicial intention.
gThe writer does not believe that the problem here considered-i.e., one of the phases
of collection "law"--can be considered as a matter apart from the general scene in which
it is found. Such an analysis is too sterile, and forecloses a complete grasp of essentials. The overall picture today includes the general conflict of capitalist democracy
[Vide, LASKI, WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE (Viking, 1940)]. A discussion of the
collection of debts requires an understanding of one of the struggles in that major field.
The struggle is just as real as that going on in the labour phase. Indeed the decisions
of the judges almost uniformly favoring the debtor group may be considered'as a
resultant of the political po~ver of the group: judges stand for election in America.
I use the word "may" advisedly in view of the mixed nature of the forces involved.
9
See Cohen, Collection of Moiey Judgments in New York: Supplementary Proceedings (1935) 35 Col.. L. RFv. 1007, 1009 et seq.
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breakdown of the protections professedly afforded "private property" (his
property). And viewed from the institutional angle of insurance, and
hearing in mind the tremendous mass of wealth located there, a prohibition
to creditors against trespassing correspondingly decreases the ultimate value
of their claims.
Whatever may be the "real" reason for judicial behavior as here revealed
one cannot miss the trend of the times. From the vantage point of the
insurance company there can be discerned a tremendous emphasis on a
protective service. When the life insurance contract is ultimately fulfilled
it works itself out in the protection of a person from the outside world,
thus satisfying the insured's desire to protect the beneficiary from starvation. The allaying of this mass fear has strange overtones and awakens
old memories: the unusual voluntary self-taxation, insofar as it withdraws
funds which could be ventured in private enterprise now, seems to run furiously towards mass proletarianization; and the fervent desire for protection
has a vague flavor of feudal homage.
Perhaps it was to have been expected that the American judges should
have been affected by the upsurging mass desire for the protection represented by insurance. But it is not without point that, having been caught in
this current they have failed to perform their duly appointed jobs: to
protect private property. If there is any irony in this, it will be for some
future Maitland to report. From our point of view, debts should be paid;
and it is with that bias that the following is written.
I.

"DEBT" AS A PREREQUISITE

Any lawyer knows that a life insurance policy may represent many varied
rights, powers, privileges and immunities in the insured. If the policy is a
"straight life" payable to the insured or his estate X may be entitled, inter
alia, to have the face amount paid to his personal representative after his
death, or to take the cash value during his life. In order to obtain the
cash value X must notify the company of his intention. This is spoken of
as an "election." The word indicates, largely, the relations existing between
X and the company. X, under the contract and the usual statute, is absolutely entitled to the cash value when he desires to obtain it. Practically,
the company always stands indebted to X in the amount of the cash value.
X has the power to compel payment by making his "election"-merely
his say so-his direction to "pay me." When divorced from the legal
plane X is always considered the company's creditor to the extent of the
cash value. That may be listed by him as an "asset." Naturally the
company so considers it, for it lists, among its liabilities, reserves sufficient
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to cover the cash values of the policies on which it is obligated. 10
Practice requires X to "surrender" his policy when he takes its cash
value. This merely means that X turns the policy in to the company. It
has no significance as far as creating the "debt." Nor is the surrender of
any importance to the company. If X had lost his policy -he could have
a new one issued in its stead. And, unless the company has notice of attaching equities of a third person, payment to X is sufficient to discharge it
of all obligations."
Such is the practice. Legally the situation is embraced in the following
conception. The company is deemed to be continuously making an irrevocable "offer" to.X to pay him the amount of his cash value. This can
be "accepted" by X only by "complying with the terms" of his policythat is, by making an election, serving it on the company, and "surrendering" his insurance policy. Then a "debt" arises in X's favor from the
company for the amount of the cash value. If the company failed to pay,
2
X could sue them, but not before.'
Now, as we have said before, attachment, garnishment, and their variants
all apply to "debts.' 12 , In other words, if the legal plane be followed they
become effective to reach intangibles due the debtor only if he could have
sued the third person and recovered. So, if the attachment or garnishment
is levied on an insurance company before the debtor has "elected" it
follows-quite simply-that there is no "debt" to which the process may
attach.
If it were not for the fact that some courts have consistently followed
the conception just described, one would dismiss it as an over-ripe example
of legal cloisterism. But, in Van Dyke Company v. Moll,13 Bethards v.
10 See the balance sheets of the companies as reported to the New York Superintendent of Insurance; for a specific illustration, the report of the New York Life Insurance
Company, found in N. Y. LEG. Doc. (1934) No. 34, vol. 2, p. 197. See also, N. Y.
INSURANcE LAw § 84.
"1Schade v. Western Union Life Ins. Co., 125 Wash. 200, 215 Pac. 521 (1923)
(policy on life of X for the benefit of Y [wife); power to change beneficiary reserved
to X; X makes a "gift" of policy to Y; later, unknown to Y, X uses policy as a collateral for a bank loan. Y did not notify the insurer of the "gift." Held: the pledgee
takes as against her on X's death). See Cohen, Creditors' Rights to Insurance Proceeds
As2 Determined By Premium Payments (1940) 40 CoL. L. R~v. 975, 1001 et seq.
' 2Van Dyke Co. v. Moll, 241 Mich. 255, 217 N. W. 29, 57 A. L. R. 692, 695 (1928).
' See, e.g., the "general" rule set out in 4 Am. JUR. § 217, p. 691 to the effect that
"purely personal" privileges, since they are not property, cannot be attached. In accord
with this "rule," the statutory right of redemption or possession after foreclosure is not
attachable, being a "mere personal right." Id. at § 219. It is not intended here to quarrel
with the rule: only with the classification of what is "purely personal" and what not.
With the great change which has taken place in business forms the test should be simply
money value. If the "thing" sought to be attached is worth something in money it should
be subject to process. "Purely personal" privileges should include such things as the
ordinary meaning of the words indicates: e.g., kissing one's wife, or other more intimate
relationships of a personal nature.
' 3 Supra note 12.
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Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,"4 Larson v. McCormack,'5 Farmers
and Merchants' Bank v. National Life Insurance Company'0 and First
National Bank of Burkburnett v. Friendl--all fairly recent cases-that precise conception was used by the courts in all seriousness to stultify creditors'
efforts to reach cash surrender values of their debtors' insurance. And
z s
even in Ellison v. Straw
a good court bowed to this idea when it evaded
the argument of "no election-no debt" by showing that the trial court had
found that X had made such an election-certainly no brave way for the
court to talk.
The basis of these decisions is, of course, the fact that garnishment and
attachment apply only to "debts"; i.e.-moneys presently due and owing.
Ergo, where "something remains to be done" by X before the insurance
company will be "indebted" to him, then there can be no "debt." Clearly
there would be no argument if the syllogism were correctly applied. For
example, if X bad agreed to build a house for Y and Y bad promised to pay
X when the house was completed, no debt would exist until X performed his
part of the contract. But in the usual insurance case the debt always
exists: it is only X's desire to get payment which has not been expressed
by affirmative action. That desire-the "election"-is conceived of as something "personal" to X, which may not be exercised by anyone other than X
himself. Since, in the typical debtor-creditor set-up, such an election would
never be exercised by X because it would be against his interest, this ideology
would have the creditor's remedy determined by an accidental factor: the
chance that X may have "exercised his election," without being aware that
the creditor was proceeding against the insurance.
Now, were the conceptions followed undeviatingly, or were they based
on reasons deemed so compelling that universal application simply had to
follow, perhaps one could not quarrel with the decisions just mentioned.
However, both have given way where the ends of justice so required. For
instance, garnishment and attachment will issue as against a debt due from
a third party even where the debtor has assigned his claim, if that was done
14287 Ill. App. 7, 4 N: E. (2d) 257 (1936), note (1937) 25 ILL. B. J. 202.
15286 Ill. App. 206, 2 N. E. (2d) 974 (1936).
16161 Ga. 793, 131 S. E. 902, 44 A. L. R. 1184, 1188 (1926).
1723 S. W. (2d) 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). The Missouri Court of Appeals in 1928,
in Industrial Loan and Investment Co. v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., supra note 5, explained
these decisions by saying that the first American case, Columbia Bank v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society, infra note 55, was the result of a special New York statute and that
all the subsequent cases were blindly patterned on that decision regardless of the local
statute. It may be regarded as curious that the special Missouri act which was so
heavily relied on to reach this conclusion was also a part of the New York Code. The
New York bench, apparently, could not sense its distinction.
18119 Wis. 502, 97 N. W. 168 (1903).
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19

fraudulently to avoid paying creditors.
The precise statement itself indicates the contradiction between the facts and the legal idea. If P is indebted to X, X has complete power of disposition. If he transfers the
claim to Q, P is no longer indebted to X, but to Q. Our legal category
which fits into the writs of garnishment and attachment only "debts" due
to the execution or attachment debtor should deny the effective operation
of the process here: for no one is indebted to .
And yet the writs are permitted to issue here when X has transferred
the claim in fraud of creditors. This is done out of a practical awareness
of the habits and characteristics of the fraudulent debtor. Theoretically
the writs should not issue, and the creditor ought to be relegated to a
fraudulent transfer action before the writs could apply. The theory of such
an action is to retransfer the debt back to X so that then the writs may issue.
This results in a great duplication of actions and energy, operates greatly
to delay the creditor, and often render effective collection impossible.
There is, in such cases, every reason of convenience and policy for permitting the issuance of the writs even though there is no "debt" when the
writs are granted. Justification is found in the conception that X really is
the owner of the "debt" as far as his creditors are concerned and it will
be considered as "due" to him so as to permit the service of the writs, subject to the condition subsequent that the creditor really prove that A made
the transfer with evil in his heart. Of course this is not so. X had the
power to transfer this claim: if he sued thereon he could not recover; nor
could his personal representatives after his death, unless a special statute
gave them power to do so on behalf of his creditors.2 0 No one could
possibly quarrel with the result even though the legal theory is not homologous with the surrounding ideology. As a practical matter it works, and
that is far better than an abstraction of adorable symmetry that would
operate imperfectly if allowed to govern decision in practical problems.
Here, then, we find an instance where theory has given way to practical
necessity. Where theory was deemed by the court so. rigid as to forbid any
bending, the legislature had to step in and supply the necessary amendment.
In Canada this was done with respect to garnishee orders ;21 in some of
the American states as to execution orders. 22 Proof, not of the absence
19Attachment: see, e.g., N. Y. DEBTOR AND CREDiTOR LAW § 278, Farlee v. Farlee, 134
Misc. 275, 235 N. Y. Supp. 239 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
Garnishment:see, e.g., Coosa Land Co. v. Stradford, 224 Ala. 511, 140 So. 582 (1932).
20
For example: N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 19.
21
The Canadian statute is discussed in Cohen, Collection of Money Judgments in New
York:
Third Party Orders (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1196, 1232-1233.
22
See Cohen, Collection of Money Judgments: Experimentation with Supplementary
Proceedings (1936) 36 COL. L. Rxv. 1061, 1087-1097.
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of judicial power to do the same thing, but of judicial sterility and lag.
In New York the same lag obtains with respect to third party orders with
the result that creditor' collection is decidedly ineffective and will remain so
until the legislature supplies the necessary verbal mucilage.23
Conceivably, it can be argued that the example just elaborated does not
supply any substantial basis for the argument that the issuance of garnishment or attachment should be deemed to be the exercise of the "election"
required in the usual insurance policy. But this is not fundamental. It is
a matter of words. And semantics, while a proper field for exercising
ingenuity to devise clarity, should not be permitted to interfere with the
solution of practical problems. For example, assume that P is indebted to
X and X's creditor has "attached" P's debt. Why can't X assign, thereafter,
to Q and still stultify the creditor? The answer is, he can. But, to permit
that would make attachment a futile process. Therefore the courts give
the writ a special content and say that with its levy there is created a "lien"
on the "debt" which simply insulates it from any further action by either X
or P until judicial order in the premises. 24 Now this is just a matter of
judicial masonry to make the process work. Merely because we have become accustomed when talking about "attachment" of debts to develop a
mental image of the physical grabbing of some definite thing by human hands
should not blind us to the fact that this picture is just a mental conception,
that the thing which is grabbed is not a thing, does not have physical existence in space, and that the attachment of intangibles seizes nothing. Its
effectiveness has depended upon another conception--"lien"--which is merely
judicial palaver to explain that X's subsequent dealing with that particular
asset will not be permitted, even at the expense of the fair-haired boy of
the law-the innocent purchaser for value.
In implementing this conception some courts speak of the attachment as
operating like an "assignment" to the creditor. This, too, is pure logomachy,
and merely designed to achieve the same ends. The reason the "assignment"
idea was not resorted to more often was the fact that the "lien" conception
had achieved the greater popularity and accomplished the same purpose.
But, inevitably, it operated to deprive X of power to deal with the asset
in question. The principle on which this was founded could, with no
greater effort, be deemed to transfer from X to his creditors or the court
power to deal affirmatively with the asset. Thus, if the attachment has the
effect of an "assignment" then the creditor should be permitted as an
"assignee" to exercise the power of "election" which was vested in the
attachment debtor.
23

24 Cohen,

supra note 21, at 1227 et seq.

Cf. Korytkowski v. Greniewicki, 220 App. Div. 237, 221 N. Y. Supp. 119 (4th Dep't

1927) ; and see Tapp v. Jones (Pooley, Garnishee), 23 W. R. 694 (1875).
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Now this is merely submitted as an outline of wordplay and ideamongering to achieve one function: to make attachment process effective
to reach cash values of insurance policies. It can be achieved in another
way. Cash value is an institutional conception supposed to represent, in
the insurance business, the excess of premiums paid during a period of
years, over the actual premium cost necessary to carry the risk of insurance.
That excess really amounts to a "deposit" of funds with the company. This
is no different from a deposit with a savings bank. In the latter case withdrawal is permitted only when the depositor brings in his passbook and
signs a withdrawal ticket-his "election" to take the cash. Now this has
never been deemed a necessary prerequisite before the "debt" will be
created so as to permit attachment to lie. Why? The answer is, apparently,
that no one ever thought of it, or thinking of it, hadn't much faith in
judicial acceptance of such palaver. And yet the insurance analogue is
quite parallel: The surrender of the policy and the "election" to take the
cash value are exactly the same as the surrender of the passbook and the
election to withdraw the funds in the savings account.
Of course, what happens here is that, by saying that an insurance company is a savings bank we soft-pedal the necessity for an "election" because
in bank accounts that argument was never adopted, although it could have
been. That is not the only way we can achieve the identical result. We
can, for example, simply say that although X is barred from collecting his
deposit account with his bank or taking his cash value on his insurance,
until he complies with the rules binding him, nevertheless such rules do not
bind his attachment creditor. That was what the court did in Maloney v.
Casey,25 were the creditor attached the debtor's bank account by trustee
process. This account was maintained under the customary regulation that
"no payment will be made without the presentation of the deposit book."
The bank argued that the plaintiff just had to get the book. The court
didn't take to that argument, explaining that :26
". .. the statutes on trustee process plainly intend that credits in
savings banks shall be subject to attachment by that process. These
statutes have made no provision for compelling the principal defendant
to surrender his deposit-book, and without such compulsion the plaintiff
usually could not obtain the book. The credits are attached and applied
to the payment of the defendant's debt to the plaintiff, against the will
25164 Mass. 124, 41 N. E. 104 (1895). While talking about the similarity-for our
purpose-of savings accounts and cash values, consider an "option": it is paid-for power
to make an election to purchase someone else's property-which, as everyone will concede,
is a little more remote than the power reserved to an insured to obtain the cash surrender
value of his own policy. Nevertheless the option is attachable: Stagg v. British Controlled
Oilfield,
Ltd., 117 Misc. 474, 192 N. Y. Supp. 596 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
26
See 164 Mass. 124, 126, 41 N. E. 104, 105 (1895).
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of the defendant, and it has not been made a condition of the attachment that the plaintiff shall conform, in bringing his action, to all the
rules which the defendant is required to observe before he can bring
an action against the bank. The plaintiff in trustee process, where the
depositor is the principal defendant, is not required to give the notice
which the depositor is often required to give before he can demand
payment of the bank. It is for the Legislature to say on what terms
trustee process shall be maintained to reach the creditors of the principal defendant, and the rules of the bank are not regarded as essential
conditions, on a compliance with which the indebtedness of the bank
to the depositor necessarily depends. We are of opinion that the
statutes do not make the liability of the bank to be charged as trustee
depend upon the plaintiff's complying with the rules of the bank, which
were intended to regulate the conduct of a depositor in his relations
with the bank."

II.

THE "PERSONAL" NATURE OF THE "ELECTION" AS A CONCEPTION
BARRING EFFECTIVE CREDITOR PROCESS

The other conception which has been used by the courts in paralyzing
provisional remedies where cash surrender values were concerned is the
picture of the insured's "election" as something curiously close and personal
to him alone: the idea is reminiscent of feudal homage. Yet the election
is often exercised by persons other than the insured: for example, in proceedings supplementary to execution. These proceedings, being a codification of the old judgment-creditor's bill, had such theoretical content as to
give the court power to act in personacr and thus to compel the debtor to
perform specific acts. So a debtor could be compelled to "elect" to take
the cash surrender values of his policies and no question was raised about
the "personal" relationship of the election to the debtor.2 7
That was, presumably, because he actually did "elect." Of course, that was plain treachery. The "election" was about as willing as force could make it: no more,
no less. If the debtor would not "elect" he stayed in jail until he did;
greater duress could not be imagined. As a matter of fact, today, some
codes-to avoid the messy business of jail-simply provide that if the
debtor won't perform the commanded act, then the court will direct the
sheriff to perform it for him.2 8 All of which comes down to the fact that
in proceedings to collect on a judgment the court will exercise the "election"
and the sacred personal nature of the relationship is just not mentioned:
obviously, a proper way to act, otherwise creditors could not realize on
their debtors' assets.
Nor will the "personal" nature of the power to elect prevent the power
27
28

Cohen, supra note 21, at 1241 et seq.
See, e.g., FED. RuLEs Civ. PRoc., Rule 70.
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from passing to a trustee in bankruptcy; but that, since it is established by
statute,- 9 is, perhaps, not a proper example here. It does indicate that
there is nothing in the nature of the power to prevent its transference and
exercise by persons other than the insured. If it may be so transferred by
statute, it ought to be transferable by the issuance of a provisional remedy,
like attachment. However, investigation discloses that the conception of
the "election" as something peculiar to X is one that has, apparently,
greatly bedevilled the courts in the insurance cases. If logically adhered to,
it would operate to X's prejudice, as, for example, if he became insane.
Yet in such a case, as was pointed out in Pendas v. Equitable Life Asrsurance
Society,3 ° the election would be made for X by another person. This person
may be either X's guardian or committee, or the chancellor. This works
out as follows: X's guardian makes the "election." This, however, is not
effective to "bind" the company until the chancellor has approved. The
reason, quite properly, is to afford some unbiassed agency an opportunity
to supervise, make an inquiry into the facts, and decide what action is most
advantageous to X. Obviously the inevitable agency is the chancellor, whose
concern for lunatics is an ancient matter. The chancellor may approve
the guardian's choice, or reprove him, and make an independent selection. 3
Theoretically, X makes the choice through his guardian. However that may
32
be, the net result is the making of the election by a person other than X.
This seems quite clear and obvious. Nevertheless, even here the reports
2930 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 110 (1937).

30129 Fla. 253, 176 So. 104 (1937).

31

The same procedure is followed when an incompetent "desires" to change the beneficiary
designation in his policies. Matter of Degnan, 122 N. J. Eq. 470, 194 At. 789 (1938) ; cf.
Kay v. Erickson, 209 Wis. 147, 244 N. W. 625 (1932). See on this general subject,
Note, Power of guardian or committee of incompetent in respect to insurance on ward's
life, or of policy under which he has interest (1933) 84 A. L. R. 366-370. For a comparable set-up: X dies leaving property devised by will. Spouse Y has, under statute, power
to take under will or "renounce" and take statutory share. If Y is insane the "eleition"
is made by the chancellor. First Nat. Bank of St. Petersburg v. MacDonald, 100 Fla. 675,
130 So. 596 (1930) ; Ambrose v. Rugg, 123 Ohio St. 433, 175 N. E. 691 (1931). See
Note, Election on behalf of incompetent to take under or against will (1931) 74 A. L. R.
452.
32
The surrender for cash value by an incompetent may involve the company in
difficulties. In Hicks v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., 166 Ia. 532, 147 N. W.
883, L. R. A. 1915A 872 (1914), and in Knoche v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 317 Pa.
370, 176 AtI. 230 (1934), that occurred. In both cases the wives were named beneficiaries.
In both they joined in the surrender; in both they sued the company for the insurance
on X's death. In the Hicks case X had a reserved power to change the beneficiary; in the
Knoche case the interest of the wife was vested. The respective courts seized on this fact
to render different results. Since Y had no interest in the Hicks case, her consent to the
surrender could not estop her from suing for the bewfit of X's estate. X was the owner
of the policy; ergo, judgment for X. In the Knoche case the wife, being the owner under
the vested interest rule, had, by joining in the surrender destroyed the policy; X's consent
was, apparently, unnecessary. The cases throw a sharp light on the wierd nature of the
"exemption" created by the various protective statutes, as interpreted by the courts, when
X's creditors are at the bar.
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contain fantasies. For example, Matter of Wainman's Estate.n -There X,
while sound, had insured his life, naming his wife as beneficiary, and reserved
the power to change the beneficiary. X became insane. His committee
wanted to surrender the policy so that they could get the cash value; otherwise X's estate would become insolvent. The mechanics of the procedure
involved were simple: the exercise of X's power to get the cash value by the
court (since X was insane). That the court had such power is obvious.
Yet the application wat denied. Nor was it denied on the wife's plea that
she owned the policy and paid all premiums. It was rejected on the grounds
that (1) the committee had no power to change the beneficiary and (2) that
under the New York exemption act the wife got a vested interest on the
issuance of the policy. That being so, argued the court, X couldn't surrender the policy while competent without his wife's consent; therefore
the committee could not do it, either, without her compliance. This, of
course, is simply legal tripe. The wife's interest was not vested and X
could have surrendered the policy while competent without her consenthe had the reserved power to strike out her interest at will. There was no
question about the committee's power to surrender: conceding their inability nevertheless, the court did have the power to exercise the election
for X, if it were to his advantage.
The cases construing the effect of an assignment for the benefit of
creditors offer an alluring opportunity to dissect the conception of intimacy
thought to inhere in the insured's power to "elect." Common sense requires that if the debtor is carrying an insurance policy under which he can
get a cash value, his assignee should be able to exercise that power: otherwise the creditors will lose a juicy asset. In Blinn v. Dane,34 X assigned
all his property for the benefit of creditors and agreed to execute such
documents as would enable the assets to "vest" in the assignee. X carried
a policy payable to his children wherein he had *the power to surrender
for cash value. The cash value was held to be covered by the assignment
and X was compelled to make the "election" necessary to enable the assignee
to get the cash value: a commendable result. Nothing was said in that
case about the personal, intimate connection between X and his election.
Townsend's Assignee v. Townseind,3 5 however, reaches the contrary result,
and, in doing so, indicates the factors which originally may have given
content to the "personal nature of the election" conception. There X
carried insurance for the benefit of his wife and children. The policy was
issued before the companies included in their contracts power inthe insured
3121 Misc. 318, 200 N. Y. Supp. 893 (Sup. Ct. 1923)

34207 Mass. 159, 93 N. E. 601, 20 Ann. Cas. 1184, 1186 (1911).

35127 Ky. 230, 105 S. W. 937, 16 L. R. A.

(N.

s.) 316 (1907).
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to change the beneficiary. X did, however, have the power to surrender
the policy for its cash value. And, as far as creditors of X were concerned,
the policy was exempt from his debts. When X assigned for the benefit of
creditors it was worth about $6,000-a considerable sum. The assignee was
denied the power to get this cash value. In reaching this conclusion the
court conceived the beneficiaries' interests as vested, subject to be defeated
by X's election to take the cash value. As "parties" to the contract they
could insist that the power of defeasance be exercised exactly as fixed in
the contract-by X alone. Life insurance is primarily devoted for the
benefit of the family of the insured. X's relationship to his family is so
personal that only he can exercise the power to surrender. No one could
love his wife and children as he does. Therefore the old rule stated by
Sugden applied, namely, that "one vested with a power, to be exercised on
behalf of or against another party to the instrument creating it, must exercise
it in person and may not delegate it to another."
Blinn v. Dame and Townsend v. Townsend are exactly alike on their facts.
The conclusions are different because the respective courts placed different
values on different social conflicts. The Massachusetts court felt that the
interests of creditors outweighed the interests of the family, championed
by the Kentucky bench. This view is verified by the opinion of the dissenters in the Townsend case, expressed in a logical essay showing that the
cash value was property which passed with the assignment. So we see that
the boudoir nature of the power to elect was concocted as an excuse to
justify the sterilizing of creditors' demands against cash surrender values.
The Kentucky court had no objection against allowing an assignee for the
benefit of creditors t6 exercise the power to take the cash value in Planters
State Bank v. Willingiwm's Assignee:"6 but there the debtor's estate was
the beneficiary and no "intimate" family relationships were at stake.
The same conflicts of social interests are reflected in the straight assignment cases. Insurance has increasingly occupied a larger status as an investment asset. It is natural to find that the insured has sought to use it in his
credit dealings. In the early cases, where the insured did not have the
reserved power to change the beneficiary or surrender the- policy for its
cash value the courts found no difficulty in denying relief to the assignee:
the vested interest rule often served to protect the beneficiary unless she
joined in the assignment. 37 Prior thereto, we have seen how the New York
courts have voided the assignments even where the wife joined therein. In
36111 Ky. 64, 23 Ky. L. R. 445, 63 S. W. 12 (1901) ; cf. Larue's Assignee v. Larue, 96
Ky.
37 326, 28 S. W. 790 (1894).
The cases illustrating this point are legion. See, e.g., Whitehead et. al. v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 102 N. Y. 143, 6 N. E. 267 (1886).
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Eadie v. Slivnmoii 8s and the string of cases following it, the judges simply
manufactured the doctrine that the "spirit" of the Verplanck statute forbade "trafficking" in wives' policies, even where the trafficking was done
by the wife. Here there was no couvert attempt to cloak what was being
done under verbiage: the New York courts were forthright in their statements that the rule was judicially constructed to protect insurance against
creditors.3 9
With the development of the modern insurance contract these devices
failed and new ones had to be found. The new policies made the insured
the complete owner of the asset: where a beneficiary was designated he
could change the designation at will, and regardless of the beneficiary's consent, could cancel the policy for its cash value. Under such policies the
beneficiary's interest was of the vaguest kind: the best legal characterization applicable was that of "expectancy." Concomitantly with the development of the new contract came an increased use of the policy in credit
transactions. Unless the courts desired to prevent the insured from dealing
with the policy at all they had to give effect to his actions. Naturally this
required decisions in favor of the creditor and against the beneficiary. 40
Perhaps the trend of decision in the creditors' favor is an indication of
judicial fear that a different attitude would result in prejudice to the interest
of the family in that it would militate against the writing of insurance in
their favor. However that may be, the courts found their way clear to
protecting an assignee of insurance, and rarely were troubled by the
intimate nature of the insured's power to elect. In Travelers Insurance
Company v. Healey,41 the New York courts held that an assignment of an
insurance policy by the insured gave the assignee the power to surrender
for cash which the insured had by virtue of the contract. In Moser v.
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Comptny 42 the Kentucky court reached
an opposite conclusion, stating that it saw no difference between a specific
3826 N. Y. 9 (1862).
39
See, e.g., the statement

in Frank v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 102 N. Y. 266,

6 N.
40 E. 667 (1886).
The issue arose as follows: X, holding a policy on his life, and having complete
dominion, designates Y as beneficiary. Then he assigns to A as collateral security. Y
does not join. X dies. Does Y take the entire proceeds, or will A be permitted to
realize on his assignment? Under the analysis here presented A should take, unquestionably. And the better-reasoned cases so declare. See, e.g., Davis v. Modern Industrial
Bank, 279 N. Y. 405, 18 N. E. (2d) 639 (1939) ; Potter v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 216 Ia. 799, 247 N. W. 669 (1933).
4125 App. Div. 53, 49 N. Y. Supp. 29 (3d Dep't 1898), aff'd on op. below, 164 N. Y. 607,
58 N. E. 1093 (1900). The case was twice tried; the first trial is reported in 28 N. Y.
Supp. 478 (Sup. Ct. 1894) ; the appeal from that judgment is reported in 86 Hun. 524, 33
N. Y. Supp. 911 (3d Dep't 1895). The second trial is reported in 19 Misc. 584, 44 N. Y.
Supp. 1043 (Sup. Ct. 1897).
42134 Ky. 215, 119 S. W. 792 (1909).
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assignment of an insurance policy and the general one involved in Townsend
v. Townsend. Here, too, it felt the interest of the beneficiary outweighed
the benefits to be derived from allowing policies to be freely used by insureds in their business dealings. But, five years later, in Mutual Benefit
Life Insurance Company v. First National Bank " the court did some tightrope walking and said that the policy in the Moser case dictated the result:
there the cash value was payable to the "insured" and, therefore, the power
was personal to him. In the Mutual Benefit case it was payable-impersonally--"on a surrender of the policy"; and this could be done by anyone, and,
therefore, by the assignee of the insured.
The distinction is so fine that one must engage in contemplative tortures
to sense it; perhaps it is a fair deduction that the Kentucky court was
withdrawing from the advanced position assumed in the Townsend controversy. At any rate the current trend of judicial decision is definitely
in the creditors' favor, and the assignment is deemed to transfer to the
assignee the powers which the insured possessed. 44 Thus in General American Life Insurance Company v. Frauenthal& Schwartz, Inc.,45 where X,
the insured, assigned "all dividend, benefit and advantage to be had" from
his policy, the assignee was held to have the status to exercise the power
to elect the option that the contract be continued on as a term policy.
In all these cases the issue largely comes down to a construction of the
scope of the assignment. Except in Kentucky, it is generally assumed that
X can write such an instrument as will delegate to the assignee the power
to make any election ;46 and basic in all the cases is the fact that X can donate
or sell his policy and make his donee or vendee the owner.4 7 In that event
logic requires that the vendee have all of X's rights and powers.48 This
169 S. W. 1028 (1914).
Davis v. Modern Industrial Bank, 279 N. Y. 405, 18 N. E. (2d) 639 (1939), reviews
the various currents of opinion in this field.
45193 Ark. 663, 101 S.W. (2d) 953 (1937).
46
See, e.g., Bank of Idana v. Illinois Life Insurance Co., 135 Kan. 129, 9 P. (2d) 629
(1932) (confirming power of pledgee to surrender for cash value) ; National Life Insurance Co. of Vermont v. Beck & Gregg Hardware Co., 148 Ga. 757, 98 S. E. 266 (1919)
(holding,
pledgee has power to "renew" term life policy).
47
Devin v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 59 Okla. 192, 158 Pac. 435, L. R. A. 1916F
783,
48 785 (1916).
Consider, e.g., the "gift" of a policy: X, having a policy on his life, and possessing all
the usual powers, names Y as beneficiary. Thereafter he "gives" it to A, without changing
the beneficiary. Does A take as against Y? The court said "Yes," in Merillat v. Hooker,
33 App. D. C. 192 (1909). Y merely had a "contingency"; X was the owner, and could
destroy Y's interest. X did so when he made a gift to A before Y's inchoate interest
vested. See, on gifts, Woodward v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 8 Cal. (2d) 361, 65 P.
(2d) 353 (1937) ; McEwen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 Cal. App. 133, 183 Pac. 373
(1919) ; Chapman v. McIlwrath, 77 Mo. 38 (1882) ; Prudential Insur. Co. v. Deyerberg,
101 N. 3. Eq. 90, 137 Atl. 785 (1927) ; Opitz v. Karel, 118 Wis. 527, 95 N. W. 948, 62
L. R. A. 982 (1903). See also Colburn's Appeal, 74 Conn. 463, 51 AtI. 139 (1902);
Malone's Estate, 8 W. N. 179 (Pa. 1880), aff'd on op. below, sub. iom. Malone's Appeal,
38 LEG. INTELL. 303 (Pa. 1881).
43160 Ky.538,
44
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position is implicit in Moon v. Williams."

If that is so, then it follows
that should X assign a policy as collateral security, then, even though his
pledgee may not be able to exercise any powers prior to foreclosure (since
those are "personal"), yet, after foreclosure, the purchaser may exercise
every power by reason of ownership.50 At least that is the conclusion of
the Kentucky court in Emery v. Manhattaa Life Insurance Company.51
But this seems to refute the prior position taken by the court in Townsend's
Assignee v. Townsend 52 as to the intimate nature of the powers. By
working around the circle the court, apparently, has reached a conclusion
which would have justified an exactly opposite result in the Townsend case.
The "personal" nature of the power thus loses any independent content it
may have- had and becomes, simply, an excuse to prevent creditors from
seizing cash values.0
Doubtless, even the courts which have stuck to the "no election-no debt"
theory, would concede that if the legislature "amended" the garnishment
or attachment procedure so as to make the service of the writ equivalent
49102 Fla. 214, 135 So. 555 (1931).

G0 Citizens Bank v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 141 So. 481 (La. App. 1932) ; Feliciana
Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 137 La. 674, 69 So. 91 (1915).
51179 Ky. 76, 200 S. W. 19, L. R. A. 1918C 568, 570 (1918).
52
Supra note 35.
53
For a comparable situation: X dies leaving a large estate, devised by will under which
Y, the spouse, does not share, or else shares in an amount which is considerably smaller
than the part which Y can claim by statute. Can a judgment creditor of Y compel Y to
"elect" to take under the statute and renounce the will? The court held not in Bottom v.
Fultz, 124 Ky. 302, 30 Ky. L. R. 479, 98 S.W. 1037 (1907), saying: "This is a personal
privilege given to the husband, and it is one which he may exercise or not, at his pleasure;
and we are of opinion that the court could not require of [Y] that he exercise that right.
The law provides that he may, within one year, renounce the will and elect to take under
the law. If he wishes to avail himself of his statutory right, he must follow the provisions of the statute, and his failure to do so within the time prescribed amounts to an
election on his part to stand by the provisions of the will; but he has the entire year
within which to act.... " Accord, Bains, etc. v. Globe Bank and Trust Co., 136 Ky. 332,
124 S.W. 343 (1910) ; Re Estate of Fleming, 217 Pa. 610, 66 Atl. 874, 11 L. R. A. (N. s.)
379 (1907) ; see Austin v. Collins, 317 Mo. 435, 297 S. W. 36 (1927) ; cf. Bradford v.
Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S. W. 502, 19 L. R. A. (N. s.) 595 (1908) (election held to
operate by "relation back" to vitiate intervening creditor's process). However, if X
dies intestate and leaves property which by law passes to A and B, A cannot "renounce"
so as to deprive his creditors of relief. Payton v. Monroe, 110 Ga. 262, 34 S. E. 305 (1899).
The cases are collected and discussed in: Note, Right of one's creditors or personal
representativesto make or control election for or against a will, or between different provisions of a will or statute .(1908) 11 L. R. A. (x. s.) 379; Note, Right of creditors to
complain of, or control, debtor's renunciation of benefit under will, or his election to take
under or against the will (1923) 27 A. L. R. 472; Note (1939) 37 Micn. L. Rxv. 1168.
It is doubtful whether the most devout believer in judicial statics could accept this dogma
without revolt. It is inescapable that insofar as judgment debtor Y has a power to bring
property into his estate, that power is property which should be made available to his
creditors. Where the same judicial stultification was revealed in Jones v. Clifton, 101
U. S. 225, 25 L. ed. 908 (1879) the legislature remedied the situation by statute [30 STAT.
565 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 110 (1937)]. It cannot be denied that the same result was
within the scope of judicial dialectic. With that as a premise there is no denying the
gross inadequacy of the cases.
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to an "election" or "demand" by X, then the writ would operate to attach
cash surrender value. Such an attitude only accentuates the divorce of the
legal plane from reality: and the judicial forum was never intended, cloisterlike, to abstract itself from practical affairs; especially in the matter of
creditors' remedies.
In Rekstin v. Severo Sibirsko et al.,54 X directed his bank to transfer the
balance in his account to Y. Shortly after the bookkeeping necessary to
transfer the balance to Y on its book had been accomplished, a creditor of X
served a garnishee order -nision the bank. Y had not "consented" to the
transfer. The court held, that the bank was still indebted to X. Acton, J.,
said that X's direction could be countermanded by him, and the garnishee
order was a "demand" sufficient to accomplish this purpose. Lord Hanworth,
after stating that X's order was revocable until Y consented, held that the
effect of the garnishee order was to revoke X's direction to have the fund
transferred to Y. And Slesser, L.J., argued that the garnishment not only
acted as a revocation, but also operated as a demand.
Now, there was nothing in the English statutes regulating garnishee
practice, which, in terms, dictated the result. It was achieved by a court
which was awake to the necessity of keeping the practice elastic to fit current
business needs and practices. The same reasoning, applied to insurance
cash surrender values, would require the holding that the service of the
writ or warrant operated as the "election" or "demand" which X could
exercise under the contract.
III.

THE POWER OF ELECTION AS WITHIN THE GRASP OF ATTACHMENT

Against this background may be discussed Columbia Bank v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society55-- probably the first case wherein the problem was
raised. Certainly it was the conclusion of the New York court there which
definitely set the "no election-no debt" hypothesis on its irresponsible path.
There X was the holder of a tontine under the terms of which, on the completion of the tontine period ending on October 8, 1888, he would be entitled, inter alia, to have the option of (1) taking in cash the policy's entire
share in the assets; or (2) convert it into a paid-up policy. Prior to the
end of the term the policy had no cash value. Attachment was levied by
the sheriff on October 8, 1888. The court held that the attachment seized
nothing because on October 8th nothing was due to X; the term did not
end until the day was over. Which meant, apparently, that the first day on
which the attachment could have been levied was October 9th. The strict
54[1933] 1 K. B. 47.
5579 App. Div. 601, 80 N. Y. Supp. 428 (1st Dep't 1903).
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correctness of this position is borne out by Ellison v. Straw.56 Had the case
been rested on that ground, it would have served to emphasize the necessity
of broadening the attachment statutes to include debts "accruing due" as
well as those "due," as was the experience in England with garnishee orders
nisi57 and subsequently in New York with third party orders5" as well as
attachments. 59 On that basis the decision is understandable, and reflects,
once again, the judicial failure to interpret existing legal remedies so as to
embrace newly developed business forms. The court, however, rested
its decision on broader grounds. After October 8th X elected to take a
paid-up policy in favor of his children. The question was argued whether
the attachment would have operated differently had it been served subsequent
to October 8th. To this the court replied in the negative. And it said:

"... It is necessary to keep clearly in mind what right [X] acquired
[X] had the
Undoubtedly ....
right to elect to surrender his policy and to withdraw its cash value.
He also had the right to elect to accept a paid-up policy . . . but this
right was exclusively vested in the legal holder of the policy...
The attaching creditor is not the legal holder of the policy. It . . . only
acquired a lien upon whatever demand there was due from the defendunder his contract with the defendant.

ant to [X]; but until the legal holder . . . had exercised his option,

there was nothing due, and no demand in favor of [X] against the insurance company existed ....

Assuming that [X] .

.

. had the right to

exercise that option notwithstanding the service of the warrant of attachment, then this action cannot be maintained, which is to recover
the amount that would have been due to [X] had he exercised the
option to withdraw the cash value of the policy upon the completion
of the tontine dividend period. No such election was ever made by
[X]. . . . Neither the plaintiff nor the sheriff was ever in a position
in which . . . they could make the election, and until that election was

actually made, there was nothing due from the insurance company
to [X].
"By section 648 of the Code of Civil Procedure the attachment may
be levied upon a cause of action arising upon contract, which belongs to
the defendant and is found within the county, and in such a case the
levy of the attachment thereupon is deemed a levy upon, and a seizure
and attachment of, the debt represented thereby. By subdivision 3 of
section 649 of the Code the levy is to be made by leaving a certified
copy of the warrant and a notice showing the property attached with
the person against whom the demand exists. Now, what is the demand
that existed in favor of [X] upon the completion of this tontine dividend period? It was the right to receive from the company either a
sum of money or a policy of life insurance, as he should elect. When
5

GSitpra note 18.
7Annual Practice, Order 45, Rules 1-9.
58N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (Cahill, 1939) § 799; see Cohen, stpra note 21, at 1221 et seq.
59
N. Y. CoDE CIv. PRoc. (Throop, 1877) § 648.
5
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the election had been made, then a cause of action arose against the
insurance company in favor of [X], which would, under Kratzenstein
v. Lehmav, and Trepagnier & Brothers v. Rose (supra) be subject to
the attachment but, as I read these sections of the Code, the right to
elect is neither a cause of action existing in favor of [X] nor a demand against the insurance company, which can be levied upon under
a warrant of attachment. 'Cause of Action' is defined in Bouvier's
Law Dictionary as 'Matter for which an action may be brought ...
A cause of action does not accrue until the existence of such a state
of things as will enable a person having the proper relations to the
property or persons concerned to bring an action." Ioi the Encyclopaedia
of Pleading and Practice (Vol. 1, p. 116) it is said: 'A cause of action
is generally held to be a union of the right of the plaintiff and its infringement by the defendant.' There could, therefore, be no cause of
action until the insurance company was in default and had failed to
comply with its contract, and there was certainly no failure of the
defendant to comply with the contract until the legal holder of the
policy had made the election provided for. The right to attach a cause
of action would not give the right to attach this right to elect under
section 648 of the Code. This right is to attach the property of the
party against whom the attachment is issued, and this is recognized by
the 3d subdivision of section 649 of the Code, which provides that the
levy may be made upon other personal property if it consists of a demand other than as specified in the 2d subdivision of the section, by
leaving a certified copy of the warrant and a notice showing the property
attached with the person against whom it exists. It must, therefore,
have been property which consists of a demand against this insurance
company, and, certainly, a right to determine what particular form the
obligation of the insurance company should be cannot be said to be
property under this subdivision. When the right to receive the money
is in existence, the demand then exists, and that demand would be
subject to attachment; but the right to determine is not such a demand.
The election preceded the existence of such a cause of action against
the defendant, as it could not have discharged its obligation until the
legal holder of the policy had exercised the right to elect. A tender of
the cash value of the policy on the completion of the tontine dividend
period would not have discharged the defendant unless the legal holder
of the policy had elected to accept that option."
We have here two stated reasons why the creditor was deemed to have
no standing to touch the cash value: (1) At the time the attachment was
levied nothing was due the debtor because he had not exercised his election;
and (2) The attachment statute did not apply so as to attach "powers." We
have already examined the first reason. The second invites some discussion.
The provisional remedies of attachment and garnishment were conceived
to apply to debts and "causes of action." Strictly speaking, a power is
neither a debt nor a cause of action. And yet a power to make a debt
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become payable would seem to be a lesser estate than the debt itself. If
the latter could be attached why not the power? A simple, logical argument
could be constructed to reach such a conclusion. However, it must be
admitted that the usual judicial reaction was opposed to such rationalization.
In bankruptcy, for instance, the debtor's "powers" did not pass to the
trustee until a special statute60 was drafted for that purpose. There the
conceptual conflict was posed as between "property"-which did pass-and
"powers." Were powers property? Jones v. Clifton61 held not. So one
might conclude that the lesson to be learned is that the legislature should
be asked to broaden the attachment statutes so as to permit the attachment
of "powers." 62 It is, however, rather disheartening that the courts have
abdicated their proper function of retranslating legal forms to keep up with
the times.

63

These words of the Columbia Bank case were echoed in the subsequent
"no election-no debt" cases. By way of further comment it is important
to remember (1) that the policy involved was a tontine-a special contract
no longer issued. No tontines were involved in the cases that followed(2) the reasoning on the point was straight dictum. It was not necessary
to decide the narrow question here presented. However, assuming the
content of the opinion on the matter discussed was valid, it was not entirely
accurate. At the end of the term the contract had a' definite cash value.
This was owing to X. He could elect to take it in cash, or he could direct
that a paid-up policy be issued. Had the latter been done, and the policy
been taken payable to X or his estate, it would have had value which could
have been ascertained in proper judicial proceedings. If X had nominated
his children as the irrevocable beneficiaries of the paid up policy, then the
transactions would have involved the transfer of value from X to them:
If X were insolvent at the time this would have constituted a fraudulent
transfer which his creditors could upset. Apart from this, X's "options"insofar as they included the power to designate himself, his children or
other persons as the beneficiaries of cash value in the form of a paid-up
policy-was merely a power to appoint. And this, by statute, had been
6030 STAT. 565 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 110 (1937).
61101 U. S. 225, 25 L. ed. 908 (1879).
62But cf. Stagg v. British Controlled Oilfields, Ltd., supra note 25, wherein an option
was
6 held attachable.
3Classically, of course, "powers" are not "property." See the discussion in 1 SiMEs,
FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §§ 265, 266. And there is still a great amount of tonguewagging over equity's determination that the creditors of a donee of a power of appointment may reach the appointed property if the power is exercised. In the light of present
day business practices, this conception reflects an ancient prejudice. An occasional
heterodox case like Hoskin v. West, 226 Iowa 612, 284 N. W. 809 (1939), noted (1939)
53 HARv. L. REv. 147, may indicate a judicial attempt to take up the lag.
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within the reach of creditors. 64 A proper regard for the meaning of the
statute should have resulted in a direction that the power after levy of
attachment could be exercised only for the benefit of X's creditors. Either
a peculiar short-sightedness on the part of the court or its desire to add
further obstacles to creditors' efforts to reach insurance values, resulted in
the conclusion it reached.
Thus far we have limited our discussion to an estate policy. But powers
to get cash values exist in all kinds of policies-including those having
designated beneficiaries. No attempt is made to argue here that the attachment statute should be deemed to override all the acts in the books. Clearly,
whether a "power" is attachable presents a bifurcated problem: first, whether
the power involved can be reached by any process; and, secondly, if it can,
will attachment be such a process. Now the courts have so construed the
insurance exemptions so as to free absolutely a power running to a debtor
in a policy designating a named beneficiary. As a substantial matter, such
powers cannot be reached by any process. The powers we are considering
are limited to those instances where the policy is non-exempt. The two
groups may be isolated on the legal terrain-insofar as the attachment angle
is involved-by saying that the attachment act will be construed "in pari
materiaf with the exemption laws: non constat our continuing objection,
in substance, to the unlimited scope of the exemption freeing such powers
from creditors' process.
IV.

POLICY CONDITIONS

The sort of judicial thinking which has given us the "no election-no debt"
solution is also responsible for some fancy interpretations of "conditions."
For example, in Larson v. McCormack,65 X carried some $50,000 worth of
insurance payable to a bank. X applied for a loan to the insurance company,
enclosing the bank's release of its interest. The loan was granted and a
check for $4,000 was mailed to the Illinois agent of the company. The
agent was instructed not to deliver the check until X nominated a beneficiary
for his policy. Meanwhile a creditor of X garnisheed the company. The
policy provided that the company could defer granting a loan for 90 days
after the application was received. On these facts the garnishment was
discharged.
Two matters were relied on to achieve the decision. First, the 90 day
period had not expired when the garnishee summons was served. This
would be a creditable answer were it not for the fact that the company had
already granted the loan and thus waived the provision. Second, the com4

6 N.

PROP. LAW, Art. 5,
TRUSTS (2d ed. 1939)

Y. REAL

also
1 ScoTT,
65

Sipra note 15.

§§ 159, 162; but see discussion infra note 72. See
§ 158.1.
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pany, for its own "protection" .could insist on the nomination of a beneficiary. The exact chain of thinking here just manages to elude analysis.
Was this a policy provision? The court does not so state. What was the
company to be "protected" against? No extraordinary danger is disclosed;
in fact none is shown. just where lay the basis for the decision: whether
in. contract or the mercy of equity, is not marked off with exactness in the
opinion. Beyond question, the case is indefensible. It cannot be distinguished from Cooper v. West,66 where the insurance company drew a check
in payment of cash value due X and forwarded the check to its agent with
instructions not to deliver until the policy beneficiaries signed releases.
Nevertheless the fund was held to be attachable.
Larson v. McCornwck is not an exact instance of the problem raised by
"policy conditions" as a barrier to the enforcement of creditors' remedies.
In Ogle v. Barron6 7 and Craven v. Roberts6 8 the fund was payable only
on the return of the certificate properly endorsed. This condition was
deemed sufficient to deny to creditors the power to garnishee the fund
since they were in no "position" to comply with the condition. In Kothe
v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company69 the contract provided that the
cash value would be paid when X surrendered the policy and executed a
satisfactory release. X, an embezzler, had absconded with the policy. Nevertheless the creditor was denied relief because he could not produce the
policy.
These cases illustrate a judicial attitude which would make it almost
impossible to apply any creditor's remedy to insurance. In the instances
quoted the obvious purpose of the "conditions" was protection to the insurance company. The conditions did not go to the essence of the contract:
they did not create the debts, nor were they part of the consideration.
Insofar as their purpose was defensive only, as against the insured debtor,
it is particularly exasperating that they should be used to cripple creditors.
It is almost incomprehensible that the courts should not have realized that
the exact results intended by the "conditions" could have been achieved by
a clause in the decree.
V.

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE

It may safely be predicated that industrial insurance, a legal will-o'-thewisp, will have an interesting career in its future journeys through the
demesnes of the law. In the older policies it was the practice to nominate
a beneficiary; the usual practice today is to the contrary. But in both
66173 Ky. 289, 190 S. W. 1085 (1917).
67247 Pa. 19, 92 At. 1071 (1915).
6860 Pa. Super. 140 (1914).

69269 Mass. 148, 168 N. E. 737 (1929).
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policies there is a clause of marvelous ingenuity, famous, under its name, as
the "facility of payment" clause. Under the ordinary policy written today
the company promises to pay to the personal representatives of the insured
uniess it elects to pay under the facility of payment clause. Under this
clause the company may pay the fund to anyone of a specified group of
people there designated by class: certain blood relatives of the insured or
persons "equitably" entitled to the insurance.
The most bewildered person in this interesting little- tangle is the creditor
of the insured, or of one of the persons who may be designated as the bene,ficiary of the fund. What rights has he? The answer, under the present
frame of reference, is a matter of grand guess work. Disregarding past
judicial conduct we will attempt the fairly hazardous job of constructing a
theory out of ancient concepts.
It should seem obvious that the owner of the insurance is the insured. His
power to assign and transfer ownership in the contract should be judicially
protected. Following therefrom, it is obvious that the insured's beneficiary
is primarily his estate-absent other valid disposition by him. The contract,
on his death, causes an obligation to arise to pay some one---call it a debt
from the company, if you will. Clearly the debt is due to the estate, in
the first instance. If there are creditors of the estate they should be
permitted to have a prior claim and first lien on the funds.
Such an attitude would have the virtue of consistency, the benefits accruing with some measure of certainty, and would afford some measure of
protection to one class of creditors. And it would be justified by many
ancient and respected conceptions of the law. The contract rights are an asset
of the insured, payable to his estate. Here the courts interpolate, and add
"subject to the election of the company to pay some one else." That election,
however, should not be permitted to prejudice estate creditors. If X, the
insured, as the donee of a power of designation could transfer an estate to
other persons, and he exercised that power, equity requires that the property
subject to the power must first go to satisfy creditors of the donee's estate
before it can be used by the beneficiary named under the power. 70 Anomalous
though it be, creditors of the donee of a power of appointment have no
claim if the power remains unexercised. 71 New York has apparently implemented the doctrine by giving equal rights to creditors even in such a case.7 2
Considering the power to designate a beneficiary under the facility of
payment clause as a power of appointment, it follows that the exercise of
70
See 1
71
2lbid.

Scor, loc. cit. supra note 64.

§§ 159, 162, 149. However, the New York courts
have interpreted the statutes so as to deprive creditors of their apparent statutory remedy.
See Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N. Y.. 522 (1881).
7 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAw, Art. 5,
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that power by X should operate to benefit his creditors under the ancient
equitable rule. And, it is not improper to consider the designation by the
company as the designation by an agent of X to exercise the power. To that
extent at least, the power is delegable-an interesting sidelight on the "personal nature" of the power so devoutly worshipped in Townsemid v. Townsend. Such a theory would always operate to the advantage of X's estate,
since it is the primary beneficiary. Exercise of the power by the company
as X's agent, in favor of some other person would redound to the benefit
of the estate's creditors under the equitable rule. And under the same rule,
apart from statutory implementation, non-exercise of the power would
equally benefit the estate, for it is the primary named beneficiary to whom
the fund is to be paid absent action under the power of appointment.
There remains to be considered creditors of the beneficiaries who may be
designated as such by the company, under the power of appointment as X's
agent. In what status do they find themselves? Here, again, we start with
the assumption that a debt there is, on X's death, due someone; if not to X's
estate, at least to anyone of a specified class. If B, a member of this class
is indebted to C, what effect should be given to an attachment, garnishment,
trustee process, or other provisional remedy served on the company by C
prior to designation of B as the beneficiary of the fund?
Orthodox conceptualism, misled by the nature of the facility of payment
clause, might say that until the company had designated a beneficiary under
the facility of payment clause, there was no "debt" and thus no attachment
3
could lie. That was the indicated reasoning in Castaldo v. Woodside,7
and yet it is certainly not correct. First, as a practical matter, such action
would result in completely sterilizing creditors' remedies against the fund,
and without any valid policy in support thereof. For, obviously, if no
"debt" existed until designation, and payment followed right on the heels of
the appointment, creditors could never have an opportunity to insulate the
fund in the company's hands by provisional remedy. Nor, in the absence
of publicity-which is always absent in such cases-could they ever know
who was the designated beneficiary so as to serve the process even in the
event of delay between appointment and payment.
Secondly, conceptualism itself is opposed to such a result. The conclusion
in the Castaldo case is premised on the assumption that no debt to the future
designee exists until designation. As stated there is a measure of truth and
untruth in the assumption. The untruth is founded in the non-recognition
of the fact that a "debt" to some one did exist all the time. The measure
of truth is indicated in the fact that there was no obligation to lay the
73295 Mass. 586, 4 N. E. (2d) 462 (1936).
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person ultimately designated as beneficiary: if other persons in the permissible class existed payment could be made to any one of them. Until
designation no one of the class could sue to recover the fund. Suit for
recovery is exclusively vested in X's estate until the company acts under
the power of appointment.7 4 But payment will ultimately be made to a
member of the class if the company acts in that member's favor. We are
faced, then, with the fact that the ancient conception of debt to some one
as the predicated basis for the issuance of provisional remedies by that
person's creditors is not alone capable of supporting attachment. However,
the court ought to seek a method for supporting the attachment, otherwise
the creditor is without remedy. This is easily shown: Attachment is served
on the company to reach a debt due to B-a member of the permissive classbefore B is named as beneficiary. Castaldo v. Woodside would hold that the
attachment is bad-no debt due to B. But if the company subsequently
did designate B and paid him, we find a course of practice outlined which
will prevent any effective creditor relief. In that exigency the courts may
have recourse to another conception to achieve a proper result: and this is
the doctrine of "relation-back." This is an ancient dogma followed in
bankruptcy and receivership matters to vest title in the trustee or receiver as
of a date prior to the actual appointment of the officer. 75 Since there is a
debt due from the company it would be a perfectly proper method of
reasoning to say that the debt was due to B, the subsequently named beneficiary, by "relation back" as of the date of the service of the provisional
remedy, so as to sustain its validity. There was the result reached in
6
Kassow v. Feldman,7
though the reasoning of the opinion does not go as far
as indicated in the present discussion. An exactly contrary decision was
made in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Hightower77 on a straight
application of the "no debt to the beneficiary finally paid" conception. The
result is the product of lethargy, dictated by a complete lack of judicial
imagination. Uniformed by any rational plan, it is merely additional evidence of the heterogeneous atomic action which is fast making industrial
insurance a nondescript creature of the law.
VI.

POLICY VALUE AS BASIS FOR PROCESS

When the creditor attached the debtor's interest in a policy he carried
T4
' Craig v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 250 App. Div. 561, 294 N. Y. Supp. 787 (Ist
Dep't 1937) ; see McCarthy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 252 N. Y. 459, 169 N. E. 645 (1930).
75See Cohen, Collection of Money Judgments in New York: Supplementary Proceedings (1935) 35 COL. L. REV. 1007, 1017, 1026.
76125 Pa. Super. 286, 189 Atl. 719 (1937).
77211 Ky. 36, 276 S. W. 1063 (1925).
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with the garnishee in Day v. New England Life Insurance Company78 cash
value had not yet achieved the importance it holds today. The creditor
failed to introduce any evidence of the cash value of the policy or X's power
to surrender for such value. Perhaps that was the reason why the creditor
failed. Support for this is found in the court's statement that X's death
was indispensable to any action on the policy. That seems to be the only
basis on which the case can be explained. Certainly the fact that insurance
policies had value had been judicially acknowledged for some time. In
Anthracite Insurance Company v. Sears,79 a policy on the debtor's life was
held to be within the reach of trustee process and value was determined
from the practice of the insurance companies to buy in their policies whenever able. The opinion in Day v. New England Life Inumrance Company
placed a great deal of emphasis on contingency as rendering the insurance
company immune from process. But in Biggert v. Straub,80 the debtor's
interest was contingent on outliving his wife. This did not prevent the
creditor from proceeding with his attachment. In such a case, said the court,
value can be ascertained by appraisal, sale, or other means within the ordinary procedure of the court.

VII. MUST

THE SHERIFF SEIZE THE POLICY?

Until recently the New York Practice Act provided that levy under a
warrant of attachment upon personal property capable of manual delivery,
including a bond, promissory note, or other instrument for the payment of
money must be made by "taking the same into the sheriffs actual custody."
Levy could be made on "other personal property, by leaving a certified copy
of the warrant, and a notice showing the property attached with the person
holding the same," or, if it consisted of a demand (other than those just
listed above) then by leaving the notice "with the person against whom
it exists." 81
That the relationship between insurer and insured is a status wherein
various rights, powers, privileges and immunities interplay is a conception
of which there can be no doubt. The policy itself is but the evidence of
the terms of this relationship. Certainly it is not a negotiable instrument
within the meaning of the statute requiring such instruments to be seized
by the sheriff as a prerequisite to a valid attachment. That,. ultimately, was
the holding in Kratzenstein v. Lehmn.8 2 But the contention that the policy
78111 Pa. 507, 4 At. 748 (1886).

79109 Mass. 383 (1872).

80193 Mass. 77, 78 N. E. 770 (1906).

siN. Y. Cirv. PRAc. AcT (Cahill, 1939) § 917.
8242 N. Y. Supp. 237 (City Ct. N. Y. 1896).
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was an "instrument for the payment of money" was solemnly made and as
solemnly accepted by the dissenting members of the court.
In New York, the problem no longer exists: the recent revisions codify
the holding of the Kratzenstein decision. s'
FUTURE DIREcTIoNs:
AND HEREIN

OF THE

NEW YoRK REVISION

The foregoing discussion, as indicated at the beginning, is capable of
bearing a varied emphasis. On the legal-the "purely" legal-plane it is an
exercise in judicial dialectics. And there an obvious lection points to judicial astigmatism in the construction of the attachment statutes. For this
purpose the insurance policy is merely one of the materials used in the
problem of analysis. But from the institutional angle the material may be
viewed differently: and here the emphasis is broader, the light more diffused.
Clearly the conclusion of the judges is another example of the special treatment which has been granted to life insurance. But this is the only thing
which can be grasped with certainty: the rest, embracing a vague and huge
horizon, is lost to us. We can stand in one part of this plane, and, looking
backwards, assert that debts should be paid. We can write down the effort
of the judges as tending to hinder the accomplishment of that desire. We
can give those efforts an intention which may never in fact have existed.
Adding these together we may produce a backdrop for a stage across which
private property charges in furious abandon.
But there we stop: The meaning of the play still remains obscure. Our
fundtion is to collect debts. And that requires us to walk a special treadmill
to a special tune: It is only from the experience of that treadmill and the
inspiration of that tune that this is written. And, limiting our vision to the
legal plane, we can review a familiar pattern. As always, where judicial
labours have resulted unsatisfactorily, recourse is had to the legislature to
restate the premise. In New York there has recently occurred a revisioq
of the attachment statutes.8 4 However, the new act still conditions the privilege of using the process on the existence of a "debt." 8 5 Nor was the legislature-at least, the statute furnishes no evidence thereof-informed of the
problem from the angle of attaching "powers." The statute does not in
haec verba attempt to make powers attachable. But there is a tantalizing
section8 6 which holds that the attachment may also be levied on:
83N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 917, as amended by Laws 1940,
4

c. 625.

8 For a discussion of this revision see Finn, The Streamlining of Attachment Procedure (1940) 9 FORD.L. REv. 1.
85N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 916, as amended.
861d., subd. 3. The present section contains six divisions; three of these are posed in
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"A debt, arising under or on account of a contract, not represented by a
bond, promissory note or other instrument for the payment thereof,
negotiable or otherwise, whether or not the said debt is past due, or yet
to become due, .

.

. provided that an action could be maintained by

the defendant within the state for the recovery of such debt at the
maturity thereof or where the debt consists of a deposit of money not
to be repaid at a fixed time but only upon a special demand, that such
demand therefor could be duly made by the defendant within the
state. The levy of the attachment thereon is deemed a levy upon, and a
seizure of all the rights of the defendant in or to the said debt."
The obvious difficulty with this section is that it still remains anchored
to "debt." Yet it does extend the scope of the process to a money deposit
not due except on special demand-and allows the attachment to create
the necessary "demand." The analogy to the insurance policy is clear; but
it is still a mere analogy. It would require a definite effort to put an equal
sign between "cash surrender value" and "deposit of money," non constat
that in reality such is the case. Even if that is accomplished the basic
defect of the statute-i.e., its failure to include powers, and its predilection with "debt"--would still remain to plague us in some future
property variations. Nevertheless, this language may provide a base on
which can be predicated a reversal of the decision in the Columbia Bank
litigation. More--this language might even justify the seizure of the cash
value of a policy wherein a named beneficiary was designated. But this
would clash with the exemption laws. And such a result would hardly be
permitted to obtain. Undoubtedly the new statute will be found to be
in par nmateria with Section 166 of the Insurance Law and its special
domain carefully circumscribed. But if that domain includes a reversal of
Columbia Bank v. Equitable Life it will be a marked improvement on the
present procedure.
terms of "debt," one bears on a "cause of action," another deals with estate interests,
and the last has to do with a "right" or "interest" in a property or fund controlled by a
fiduciary which can be transferred by the debtor. The "cause of action" clause is not
applicable to our problem; none exists until the insured has exercised his election. The
"fiduciary" section may or may not be in point; it is general enough to serve the
purpose, if the courts will feed it the necessary content. Its very generality, however,
is against it if it should be tossed into the lap of a hostile bench. That the statute was
not drafted with any eye to the point involved here seems obvious. And in recommending
the enactment of the statute, the Legislation Committee of the Association of the Bar
commented only that the bill would effect: "Abolition of the doctrine that an attachment
is leviable only on legal interests and does not extend to equitable interests in personalty.
Extension of the right to attach to various classes of assignable property .... " Co MITEE
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